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Abstract
Oates reminds us that tax competition among localities in the
presence of capital mobility, may lead to ine¢ ciently low tax rates
(and bene￿ts). In contrast, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that
tax competition yields an e¢ cient outcome, so that there are no
gains from tax coordination. This paper demonstrates that when
a group of host countries faces an upward supply of migrants,
labor and capital income tax rate under competition are higher
than under tax coordination, due to a ￿scal externality.
JEL Classi￿cation: F2, H2
Keywords: Tax Competition, Tax Coordination, Fiscal Externality
1 Introduction
In this paper we re-examine the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis when
several host countries compete for an upward slopping supply of immi-
grants from the rest of the world. We also revisits the Tiebout paradigm
which suggests that the tax competition yields e¢ cient outcomes.
We assume that there is a large enough number of competing host
countries, to allow us to treat each host country as a "perfect competi-
tor". The rest of the world serves as a reservoir of migrants for the host
countries. That is, the rest of the world provides exogenously given,
upward sloping, supply curves of unskilled and skilled immigrants to the
host countries.
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1We address the issue whether tax competition among host countries
is ine¢ cient, relative to tax coordination, in the presence of migration.
Referring to tax competition among localities in the presence of capital
mobility, Oates (1972, p. 143) argues that competition may lead to
ine¢ ciently low tax rates (and bene￿ts):
"The result of tax competition may well be a tendency
toward less than e¢ cient levels of output of local services. In
an attempt to keep taxes low to attract business investment,
local o¢ cials may hold spending below those levels for which
marginal bene￿ts equal marginal costs, particularly for those
programs that do not o⁄er direct bene￿ts to local business."
Considering international capital mobility, tax-competition among
countries, may lead to ine¢ ciently low tax rates and welfare-state ben-
e￿ts because of three mutually reinforcing factors. First, in order to
attract mobile factors or prevent their ￿ ight, tax rates on them are re-
duced. Second, the ￿ ight of mobile factors from relatively high tax to
relatively low tax countries shrinks the tax base in the relatively high
tax country. Third, the ￿ ight of the mobile factors from relatively high
tax to relatively low tax is presumed to reduce the remuneration of the
immobile factors, and, consequently, their contribution to the tax rev-
enue. These reinforcing factors reduce tax revenues and, consequently,
the generosity of the welfare state.
Our model is somewhat similar to Tiebout￿ s (1956) framework of
competition among localities. Tiebout￿ s model features many "utility-
taking" localities, analogous to the perfect competition setup of many
"price-taking" agents. Naturally, Tiebout competition yields an e¢ cient
outcome.1 The Tiebout paradigm considers the allocation of a given
population among competing localities. Our model of international tax-
transfer and migration competition among host countries deviates from
the Tiebout paradigm in that the total population in the host countries
and its skill distribution are endogenously determined through migration
of various skills. As a result, competition needs not be e¢ cient. We
therefore study also the policies that ensue through coordination among
the host countries and compare them to the competition policies.
Typically, models of tax competition among host countries consider
a given system of collective decision making. For instance, many mod-
els assume that policy is determined by maximizing some social welfare
1See Wilson (1999), and Bovenberg et al (2003), for a comprehensive surveys of
theories on tax competion. Razin and Sadka (1991) who consider tax competition
among "price taking" small countries, in the presence of capital mobility, show that
there are no gains from tax coordination. Mendoza and Tesar (2005), and Sorensen
(2001), calibrate tax competition general equilibrium models to Europe.
2function. Another possibility is decision by majority voting . In this pa-
per, we adopt the second approach. Broader analysis of the interactions
between the welfare state ￿scal stance and migration is in Razin, Sadka
and Suwankiri (2011).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews ev-
idence on the ￿scal burden of migration. Section 3 develops a parsi-
monious model of tax-migration competition. Section 4 extends the
model to allow tax coordination. Section 5 compares (via numerical
simulations) the set of policies that ensue under competition and under
coordination. Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence on the Fiscal Burden of Migration
To motivate, it is worthwhile to review some evidence on the ￿scal as-
pects of migration and on native born attitudes toward immigration,
before we develop the tax competition model.
In 1997 the U.S. National Research Council sponsored a study on the
overall ￿scal impact of immigration into the U.S.; see Smith and Edmon-
ston (1997). The study looks comprehensibly at all layers of government
(federal, state, and local), all programs (bene￿ts), and all types of taxes.
For each cohort, de￿ned by age of arrival to the U.S., the bene￿ts (cash
or in kind) received by migrants over their own lifetimes and the lifetimes
of their ￿rst-generation descendents were projected. These bene￿ts in-
clude Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income (SSI), Aid
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), etc. Similarly, taxes paid
directly by migrants and the incidence on migrants of other taxes (such
as corporate taxes) were also projected for the lifetimes of the migrants
and their ￿rst-generation descendents. Accordingly, the net ￿scal burden
was projected and discounted to the present. In this way, the net ￿scal
burden for each age cohort of migrants was calculated in present value
terms. Within each age cohort, these calculations were disaggregated
according to three educational levels: Less than high school education,
high school education, and more than high school education.
Indeed the ￿ndings suggest that migrants with less than high school
education are typically a net ￿scal burden that can reach as high as ap-
proximately US-$100,000 in present value, when the immigrants￿age on
arrival is between 20￿ 30 years. See also the related analysis of Auerbach
and Oreopoulos (1999).
Following the recent enlargement of the European Union to 27 coun-
tries, only three members of the EU-15 (the UK, Sweden and Ireland)
allowed free access for residents of the accession countries to their na-
3tional labor markets, in the year of the ￿rst enlargement, 2004. The
other members of the EU-15 took advantage of the clause that allows
for restricted labor markets for a transitional period of up to seven years.
Focusing on the UK and the A8 countries, Dustmann at al (2009) bring
evidence of no welfare migration. The average age of the A8 migrants
during the period 2004-2008 is 25.8 years, considerably lower than the
native U.K. average age (38.7 years). The A8 migrants are also better
educated than the native-born. For instance, the percentage of those
The A8 countries are the ￿rst eight accession countries (Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland.) More accu-
rately, the said period extends from the second quarter of 2004 through
the ￿rst quarter of 2009 that left full-time education at the age of 21 years
or later is 35.5 among the A8 migrants, compared to only 17.1 among
the U.K. natives. Another indication that the migration is not predomi-
nantly driven by welfare motives is the higher employment rate of the A8
migrants (83.1%) relative to the U.K. natives (78.9%). Furthermore, for
the same period, the contribution of the A8 migrants to government rev-
enues far exceeded the government expenditures attributed to them. A
recent study by Barbone et al (2009), based on the 2006 European Union
Survey of Income and Living conditions, ￿nds that migrants from the
accession countries constitute only 1-2 percent of the total population
in the pre-enlargement EU countries (excluding Germany and Luxem-
burg); by comparison, about 6 percent of the population in the latter
EU countries were born outside the enlarged EU. The small share of mi-
grants from the accession countries is, of course, not surprising in view
of the restrictions imposed on migration from the accession countries to
the EU-15 before the enlargement and during the transition period after
the enlargement.
The study shows also that there is, as expected, a positive corre-
lation between the net current taxes (that is, taxes paid less bene￿ts
received) of migrants from all source countries and their education level.
Hainmeueller and Hiscox (2010), using survey data in the US, ￿nd two
critical economic concerns that appear to generate anti-immigrant sen-
timents among voters: concerns about labor-market competition, and
concerns about the ￿scal burden on public services. Not unexpect-
edly, employing opinion surveys, Hanson et al (2007) bring evidence
that in the United States native residents of states which provide gener-
ous bene￿ts- to migrants also prefer to reduce the number of migrants.
Furthermore, the opposition is stronger among higher income groups.
Similarly, Hanson et al (2009), again employing opinion surveys, ￿nd for
the United States that native-born residents of states with a high share
of unskilled migrants, among the migrants population, prefer to restrict
4in migration; whereas native-born residents of states with a high share
of skilled migrants among the migrant population are less likely to fa-
vor restricting migration6. Indeed, developed economies do attempt to
sort out immigrants by skills (see, for instance, Bhagwati and Gordon
(2009)). Australia and Canada employ a point system based on se-
lected immigrants￿characteristics. The U.S. employs explicit preference
for professional, technical and kindred immigrants under the so-called
third-preference quota. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) ￿nd that both the
Australian and American selection mechanisms are e⁄ective in sorting
out the skilled migrants, and produce essentially similar outcomes de-
spite of their di⁄erent legal characteristics.2
3 Analytical Framework
Consider n identical host countries engaged in competition over mi-
grants, skilled and unskilled , from the rest of the world. The model
incorporates two channels through which native households are e⁄ected
by migration: the wage channel and the ￿scal channel. The former
relates to the fact that skilled (unskilled) individuals favour unskilled
(skilled) migration since it boosts their wage. The latter relates to the
fact that all migrants contribute to the ￿nancing of the public good
through a proportional income tax (on both labor and capital).3
3.1 Representative Host Country
A representative host country produces a single good by employing two







  0  ￿  10  ￿  1 (1)
where,  is GDP,  denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and
 denotes the input of labor of skill level , where  =  for skilled
and unskilled, respectively, K denotes the input of capital, ￿ denotes
the share of capital, and ￿ denotes the share of skilled labor in the total
share, 1 ¬ ￿, of labor.
2See also Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002); See also Mayda (2006)
3There exists a body of literature which emphasizes the importance of both chan-
nels. The wage channel is analayzed in, for instance, Ortega (2005) and olso partly
in Kemnitz (2002). Ortega goes even further than this paper and allows migrants to
become part of the electorate in the period after migration has taken place.
5The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are, respectively,
 = (1 ¬ ￿)￿ (2)
 = (1 ¬ ￿)(1 ¬ ￿)
Note that the abundance of skilled labor raises the wage of the un-
skilled, whereas abundance of unskilled labor raises the wage of the
skilled.
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respec-
tively, is given by:
 = ( + ) (3)
 = (1 ¬  + )
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native-born is
normalized to 1;  denotes the share of native born skilled in the total
native-born labor supply;  denotes the number of skilled migrants;
 denotes the total number of unskilled migrants; and  is the labor
supply of an individual with skill level  2 fg
Total population (native born and migrants) is as follows
 = 1 +  +  (4)
The rental price of capital is given by the marginal productivity con-
dition:
 = ￿ (5)
(we assume for simplicity that capital does not depreciate). A skilled
individual holds a stock of capital, ￿ , which is larger than the stock of
capital, ￿ , which is held by an unskilled individual; that is ￿   ￿ ,
so that the skilled is unambiguously richer than the unskilled. An indi-
vidual can rent her capital either at home or at the other host countries.
Thus, the total stock of capital owned by residents,  ￿  + (1 ¬ ) ￿ 
(assuming that migrants own no capital), does not have to equal K, the
total inputs of capital. Capital taxation, if any, is levied according to the
source principle, according to which each country taxes only the capital
employed in that country4. Denote the net-of-tax rental price of capital
4We do not consider residence-based taxation of capital, according to which each
country taxes its residents on all the capital they own, irrespective of its location.
In this case the capital tax policy does not change the capital tax base. Thus,
tax competition over mobile capital does not a⁄ect tax policy. We therefore do
not consider residence-based taxation. Also, residence-based taxation is not readily
enforceable.
6in all other host countries by ￿ . Then, the residents of the representative
host country must enjoy the same net-of-tax rental price at home, that
is:
(1 ¬ ￿) = ￿  (6)
where ￿ is the tax rate on capital employed by our representative
host country.
We specify a simple welfare-state system in which there is a dual
tax system: a tax at the rate ￿ on labor income and a tax at the
rate ￿ on capital income. We allow for di⁄erent rates of taxation of
labor and capital in order to examine the e⁄ects of migration and capital
mobility separately on capital and labor taxation. The revenues from all
taxes are redistributed equally to all residents (native born and migrants
alike) as a demogrant,  per capita. The demogrant may capture not
only a cash transfer but also outlays on public services such as education,
health, and other provisions, that bene￿t all workers, regardless of their
contribution to the ￿nances of the system. Thus, b is not necessarily a
perfect substitute to private consumption.
The government budget constraint is given by:
 =
￿ + ￿( + )

 (7)
Note that we assume that migrants are fully entitled to the welfare
state system. That is, they pay the tax rate ￿ on their labor income
(they own no capital) and receive the bene￿t b. The two types of indi-
viduals share the same utility function,





 + ln() (8)
where  denotes consumption and   0, in the labor supply elasticity.
Recall that we interpret b not just as a pure cash transfer, but rather as
some public service that creates a utility of ln(b)5.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level  is
 = (1 ¬ ￿) + (1 + ￿ ) ￿  2 fg (9)
5This interpretation of b and the speci￿cation of the utility derived from it ensure
that everyone, including the rich, opts for some positive level of b and is willing to
support some taxation
7Note that an individual earns a net-of-tax rental price of ￿  on all the
stock of capital she owns, no matter in which country it is employed.
Individual utility-maximization yields the following labor supply equa-
tion
 = ((1 ¬ ￿))
  2 fg (10)
The indirect utility function of an individual of skill level  2 fg
is given by




1+ + (1 + ￿ ) ￿  2 fg (11)
We also assume that
￿(1 ¬  + )
(1 ¬ ￿)( + )
 1 (12)
which ensures that the wage of the skilled always exceeds the wage of
the unskilled (  ).

3.2 Supply of Migrants
We assume that there is free migration according to an exogenously given
upward supply of migrants of each skill type from the rest of the world
to all host countries6. Speci￿cally, the number of migrants of each skill
type that wish to emigrate to the host countries rises with the level of
utility (well-being) that they will enjoy in the host countries. A possible
interpretation for this upward supply is as follows. For each skill type
there is a heterogeneity of some migration cost (due to some individual
characteristics such as age, family size, portability of pensions, etc.).
This cost generates a heterogeneity of reservation utilities, giving rise to
an upward sloping supply of migrants. We denote the supply function
of skill  2 fg by
 = () (13)
where  is the number of migrants of skill type  and  is the level
of utility enjoyed in the host counties,  2 fg.
6In Razin and Sadka (2010) we consider a host-source country contest and endo-
genise the supply of migrants to a single host country, abstracting from competition
among many host countries over the same pool of migrants. Here we consider an
exogenous supply of immigrants, as we focus on competition among many host coun-
tries.
8We assume that would-be migrants are indi⁄erent with respect to the
identity of the would-be host country. All they care about is the level of
utility they will enjoy. Therefore, in equilibrium, the utility enjoyed by
migrants of each skill type is the same in all host countries. Denote this
equilibrium cuto⁄ utility level by ￿  2 fg.
Being small enough, each host country takes these cuto⁄utility levels
as given for her. That is, each host country behaves as a "utility - taker",
in analogy to the "price taking" behavior of each agent in perfectly
competitive market.
3.3 Fiscal Policy Choice
A representative host country determines its ￿scal policy by majority
voting among the native born. For concreteness, we describe in details
the case where the native-born skilled form the majority, that is   05
(the other case is speci￿ed similarly). Thus, the ￿scal policy variables,
￿￿ and , are chosen so as to maximize the indirect utility of the
skilled (given in equation (11)), subject to the government budget con-
straint (given in equation (7)), and to the free migration constraints:
(￿￿) ¬ (1 + ￿ ) ￿  = ￿  (14)
and
(￿￿) ¬ (1 + ￿ ) ￿  = ￿  (15)
assuming that the migrants have the same preferences as the native-
born, and recalling that migrants own no capital.
In determining their policy, the government takes also into account
that  and  are determined in equilibrium by
equations (1)-(6), and (10).
Note that in setting the optimal ￿scal policy, a representative host
country takes the migrants cuto⁄ utility levels, ￿  and ￿  as given, and
also takes the net of tax return to capital, ￿ , as given. Denote by an
asterisk (*) the levels of the economic variables that ensue with optimal
￿scal policy.
3.4 Symmetric Tax - Competition Equilibrium
Each one of the n identical host countries admits ￿
 skilled migrants
and ￿
 unskilled migrants. Thus, the aggregate demand for skilled
and unskilled migrants is ￿
 and ￿
. Therefore, the cuto⁄ utilities
9enjoyed by migrants, ￿  and ￿ , are determined in a symmetric Nash-
equilibrium, so as to equate supply and demand:7

￿




 = (￿ ) (17)
Also, the world wide net-of-tax rental price of capital, ￿  is deter-
mined so as to equate world demand for capital, ￿, to world supply,
( ￿  + (1 ¬ ) ￿ ), that is:

￿ =  ￿  + (1 ¬ ) ￿  (18)
4 Fiscal Coordination
So far we assumed that the host countries compete with each other with
respect to the volume and the skill-composition of migrants, and for
capital. Presumably, an unskilled median voter opts to admit skilled
migrants, for two reasons: First, such migrants are net contributors to
the ￿nances of the welfare state, that is the tax that each one pays
(namely, ￿) exceeds the bene￿t she receives (namely, b). Second,
skilled migrants raise the wage of the unskilled. On the other hand,
a skilled median voter may opt for both types of migrants. Unskilled
migration raises the wage of the skilled but imposes a ￿scal burden on
the welfare state. Skilled migration lowers the wage of the skilled but
contributes positively to the ￿nances of the welfare state. Thus, the
volume and skill-composition of migration to each one of the n identical
host countries are determined in a general, uncoordinated competitive
equilibrium.
An alternative, albeit di¢ cult to sustain, is for the host countries to
coordinate their ￿scal policy so as to maximize the utility of their decisive
median voter8. Naturally, this coordination comes at the expense of the
7Because of the constant returns-to-scale assumption, one may think that there
is no unique determination of the size of internatinal ￿ oes (of labor and capital).
But the upward aggregate supply of migrants and the ￿xed aggregate stock of capital
insure uniqueness in equilibrium (like the case of many ￿rms with constan-returns-
to-scale technologies in industry equilibrium).
8This coordination is among the host countries only, unlike some other coordi-
nation arrangements (such as under the auspices of the WTO) that refer to both
exports and imports of goods and services. The coordination discussed here may be
relevant to unions of countries with independent tax policies such as the EU which
can coordinate a uniform migration and tax policy towards the rest of the world (as
the U.S.A does).
10migrants.
In a coordinated-policy regime the cuto⁄ utilities, ￿  and ￿ , are
also controlled by the host countries, taking into account that migration
takes place according to the migration equations (14) and (15). They set
also the common (by symmetry) tax rate on capital, and consequently
￿ , taking into account the capital resource constraint (18).
5 Competition vs. Coordination: Is there a Race
to the Bottom
Evidently, coordination can only improve the well-being of the skilled
which is in power (recall that we consider for concreteness the case S 
0.5) compared to its well-being under competition.
In this section we compare also the tax policies that arouse under
competition and under coordination. Speci￿cally, we ask whether com-
petition can lead to "a race to the bottom" in the sense that it yields
lower tax rates and welfare-state bene￿ts, relative to the coordination
regime. We carry this comparison via numerical simulations. In the ap-
pendix we attempt to provide a rough sketch of how an analytic analysis
may proceed.
Figure 1 depicts the results of numerical simulations. In panel (a) we
plots the labor and capital tax rates in the coordination and competition
regimes on the vertical axis and the host country productivity on the
horizontal axis.
[Insert ￿gure 1 here]
Parameters: ￿ = 0.7; ￿ = 0.33;  = 0.1;  = 0.6;  = 6.2 to 7.2; ￿ 
= 1; ￿  = 0.5;  = 1;  = 1.5; (￿ ) = (￿ ) = (￿  )
The ￿gure clearly refutes the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis for both
the labor and the capital income taxes: the taxes are lower in the coor-
dinated regime than in the competitive regime.
The rationale for this somewhat suprising results seems to be quite
basic: a ￿scal externalitiy associated with the volume of migration.
There are gains and losses brought about by migration. A host coun-
try has an infra-marginal gain from migration because of the diminishing
productivity of labor for a given stock of capital. On the other hand, the
native-born population shares with migrants the tax collected from capi-
tal income (recall that migrants have no capital): the transfer b that the
migrants receive in not ￿nanced fully by their labor income tax. That
11is, the capital tax revenues paid by the native-born population "leak"
also to the migrants9. Each host country in a competitive regime evi-
dently balances on the margin the gains and losses from migration. In
doing so, each country takes the well-being of the migrants as given (see
equation (14) - (15)). It ignores the fact that a tax-migration policy that
admits an extra migrant raises the well-being that must be accorded to
migrants by all host countries, in order to elicit the migrant to come
in. As a results, it o⁄ers migrants too high level of b, levies too high
taxes, and admits too many migrants. Indeed, ￿gure 1(b) shows that
the number of both types of migrants is higher in the competitive than
in the coordinated regime. Note also that tax rates on capital income
are lower than tax rates on labor income. This is a way that native born
who is endowed with capital take advantage of the migrants, who have
no capital.
Figure 2 shows similar results for the case where the unskilled form
the major: tax rates are higher and the number of migrants is higher in
the competitive than in the coordinated regime.
[Insert ￿gure 2 here]
Parameters: ￿ = 0.7; ￿ = 0.33;  = 0.1;  = 0.4;  = 6.2 to 7.2; ￿ 
= 1; ￿  = 0.5;  = 1;  = 1.5; (￿ ) = (￿ ) = (￿  )
6 Conclusion
The literature on tax competition with free capital mobility cites sev-
eral reasons for the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in the sense that tax
competition may yield signi￿cantly lower tax rates than tax coordina-
tion. With a ￿xed (exogenously given) population that can move from
one ￿scal jurisdiction to another, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that
tax competition among these jurisdictions yields an e¢ cient outcome,
so that there are no gains from tax coordination. This paper provides
some support to the Tiebout hypothesis. It suggests that when a group
of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, tax competition
does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to
higher taxes than coordination. We identify a ￿scal externality (￿scal
leakage) that causes tax rates (on both labor and capital), and the vol-
ume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive
regime than in the coordinated regime.
9Fiscal leakage e⁄ects are analyzed in Razin and Sadka (2001)
127 Appendix
In order to shed some light on the analytics of the results consider a
very simple model, with only one type of migrants and suppose that the
government owns all the capital. Note that the transfer () depends on
the labor tax (￿) and the number of migrants (). Denote then the
indirect utility function by  (￿). In a competitive (uncoordinated)
regime each government solves the following optimization program:
maxf￿gV(￿)
s.t.  (￿) ￿ ￿ 
where ￿  is the utility level that must be enjoyed by the migrants and
is considered to be exogenously given by each government. At equilib-
rium we have  = (￿  ), where  is the supply function of migrants.
thus, a competitive (uncoordinated) equilibrium is given by
(A1) ￿ + ￿V￿ = 0
(A2)  + ￿V = 0
(A3) ￿  = ()
where ￿ is a Lagrange multiplier and  is the inverse of . Note that
there is an upward sloping supply of migrants, so that 0  0. Note also
that (A1) and (A2) imply that
(A4) ￿ =  = 0
In a coordinated regime, the optimal policy is a solution to the fol-
lowing regime:
maxf￿gV(￿)
s.t.  (￿) ￿ (￿)
Thus, the optimal policy is characterized by
(A5) ￿ + ￿￿ = 0
(A6)  + ￿ ¬ ￿0
 = 0
We can then conclude that
(A7) ￿ = 0
(A8)   0
(Recall that 0  0)
Denote the competitive equilibrium levels of ￿ and  by ￿￿ and ￿,
respectively. At ￿, we have  = 0 (see equation (A4)). Suppose that
 ￿rst rises with  until it peaks at the competitive level of  (which is
￿), and then declines. Hence,   0 for  ￿ ￿. Therefore, it follows
from (A8) that the coordinated level of  is below ￿. That is, there
are fewer migrants in the coordinated regime than in the competitive
(unregulated) regime.
Moving from the coordinated to the competitive regime presumably
lowers ￿. This is because  is higher in the competitive regime and
hence, due to the "￿scal leakage" e⁄ect, ￿ falls below zero. In order
13to set ￿ back to zero at the competitive regime, ￿ must fall, if ￿￿ is
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